### 1AC – Plan Text

#### Plan: The United States federal government should increase economic engagement toward Mexico through an economic investment fund.

### 1AC – North American Integration

#### Advantage 1: North American Integration

#### North American regional economic strength is vulnerable. A breakdown of cooperation with Mexico would cause the decline of American power.

Clarkson & Mildenberger ‘11 Stephen Clarkson, professor of political economy, University of Toronto, and former fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center Matto Mildenberger, Ph.D. student, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct Us Power p. 272

The United States’ relationship with Canada and Mexico thus presents a paradox. Does North America Exist? showed that globalization was reducing the salience of North America as an economic entity, whether in the steel sector ‘s global restructuring or in the international consolidation of banking regulations. However, even as North American regionalism falters, the United States’ immediate periphery is becoming a more important partner in sustaining its material power. Constrained by its global partners’ superior growth rates, the United States can still count on the unusually beneficial economic relationship it quietly maintains with its continental periphery. Although it normally ignores its neighbours’ interests when dealing with other countries, its gradual decline no longer affords Washington this luxury without having to pay a price. That price is its two neighbours expanding their strategic gaze from the continent to the world. Canada and Mexico are endeavouring to strengthen their economic links with other countries. Indian capital is already investing in iron-ore extraction in Quebec, while Chinese firms are staking out Alberta’s tar sands. Even with disputes over Newfound land’s seal industry and its visa restrictions on Czech visitors, Canada has busily negotiated a comprehensive economic trade agreement with the European Union. Hosting the G-20 Economic Summit in 2012, Mexico is positioning itself as the champion of emerging economies and the developing world. This economic internationalization could mitigate Canada’s and Mexico’s lopsided dependencies on a US market to which their access has been curtailed since 9/11. Should they succeed in diversifying their economic links by attracting more FDI from overseas and should their extra-regional imports and exports abroad begin to expand more than their intra-regional trade, the United States’ economic perimeter in North America will contract, and their construction of US material strength will ipso facto diminish. The North American periphery has been Uncle Sam’s gold-laying goose for as long as most can remember. It would make an ironic epitaph for the United States’ hegemonic decline if alienating its most valuable and easily cultivated foreign asset accelerated its self-induced fall.

#### The plan will accelerate effective investment in Mexico and provide a foundation for North American integration

Pastor ‘8 – Prof and founding director of the Center for North American Studies

Robert, The Future of North America, July/August, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf>, CMR

Another challenge is to narrow the gap in income that separates¶ Mexico from its northern neighbors by creating a North American¶ investment fund. The fund should target $20 billion a year to connect¶ central and southern Mexico to the United States with roads, ports,¶ and communications. With the goal of building a North American¶ Community, all three governments should commit to narrowing the¶ income gap, with each deciding how it could best contribute. Since¶ it will beneﬁt the most, Mexico should consider contributing half of¶ the money for the fund and also undertake reforms—ﬁscal, energy,¶ and labor—to ensure that the resources would be effectively used. The¶ United States should contribute each year 40 percent of the fund’s¶ resources—less than half the cost each week of the war in Iraq—and¶ Canada, 10 percent. Since naftawas put into place, the northern part¶ of Mexico has grown ten times as fast as the southern part because it¶ is connected to the Canadian and U.S. markets. North America can¶ wait a hundred years for southern Mexico to catch up, or it can help¶ accelerate its development—which would have positive consequences¶ in terms of reducing emigration, expanding trade, and investing in¶ infrastructure to help Mexico enter the developed world.¶ North America’s model of integration is diªerent from Europe’s.¶ It respects the market more and trusts bureaucracy less. Still, some¶ institutions are needed to develop continental proposals, monitor¶ progress, and enforce compliance. The three leaders should institutionalize summit meetings at least annually, and they should establish a North¶ American commission composed of independent and distinguished¶ leaders from academia, civil society, business, labor, and agriculture¶ and with an independent research capacity. The commission should¶ oªer continental proposals to the three leaders. The leaders would¶ continue to be staffed by their respective governments, but they would¶ respond to a continental, rather than a dual-bilateral, agenda. The¶ commission should develop a North American plan for transportation¶ and infrastructure and plans on labor, agriculture, the environment,¶ energy, immigration, drug tra⁄cking, and borders.¶ The three heads of state must also commit to building a new¶ consciousness, a new way of thinking about one’s neighbors and¶ about the continental agenda. Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans¶ can be nationals and North Americans at the same time. Indeed,¶ an appreciation of one’s neighbors as part of a compelling North¶ American idea could enhance the prestige of each country.To educate¶ a new generation of students to think North American, each country¶ should begin by supporting a dozen centers for North American¶ studies. Each center should educate students, undertake research,¶ and foster exchanges with other North American universities for¶ both students and faculty.¶ This is a formidable agenda that could transform North America¶ and each of its states. It is not possible without a vision, and it is not¶ feasible without real leadership and credible institutions. But with all¶ three, a North American Community can be built. The existence of¶ such a community would mean that the United States would consult¶ its neighbors on important issues that aªected them. It would mean¶ that Canada would work closely with Mexico to build rule-based¶ institutions and to develop a formula for closing the development¶ gap. It would mean that Mexico would undertake reforms to make¶ good use of the additional resources.¶ This is a very diªerent agenda than seeking to improve working¶ conditions and the environment by rewriting nafta and threatening¶ to increase tariªs. Labor and environmental issues should be part of¶ the North American dialogue working to improve the continent, but¶ there is no evidence that foreign investors move to Mexico in order¶ to take advantage of lax labor and environmental rules. Quite the¶ contrary: Mexico’s labor laws are so rigid that they often discourage¶ foreign investors. Moreover, they incorporate the eight core international labor standards, whereas the United States has not approved¶ six of them. As for its environmental laws, Mexico maintains standards that are quite good; the problem is that it lacks funds for enforcement or cleanup.¶ The immigration issue also needs to be addressed in this broader¶ context. A fence is needed in some places, but building a 700-mile¶ wall would be more insulting than eªective. If the United States is¶ going to try to forge a community, it needs to articulate an approach¶ that acknowledges that it is complicit in the immigration problem in¶ hiring illegal immigrants, who work harder for less. More important, if¶ the United States were to join with Mexico in a serious commitment¶ to narrow the income gap, then cooperation over other issues would¶ become possible. The best place to enforce immigration policy is in¶ the workplace, not at the border, but national, biometric identiﬁcation¶ cards will be needed for everyone to make the policy eªective, and a¶ path to legalization will be needed to make it just.

#### Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 12   
Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### This is true for the entire globe – Mexico is a key pillar for U.S. hegemony

Smith 13   
Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### North American integration key to solve democracy, disease, and the environment

Céspedes ‘8 – Diplomat in Residence, School of International Service and Senior Fellow,Center for North American Studies

Ernesto, North America, Security, and the Next US¶ National Security Strategy:¶ A Reflection, April 29, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/0804Cespedes_Reflection.pdf>, CMR

Under the topic “Working with others in defusing regional conflicts”, Mexico and¶ Canada, along with Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, were mentioned as part of a group of¶ countries with which the US had “…formed flexible coalitions… Together we will¶ promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration advances security,¶ prosperity, opportunity, and hope.”¶ 19¶ Not even bilateral cooperation with Mexico against drug trafficking was in the minds of¶ the post-9/11 security strategists: “Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict,¶ especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict¶ and unrestrained narcoticstrafficking could imperil the health and security of the United¶ States. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust¶ their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply¶ of drugs, while—as important—we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own ¶ country.”¶ 20¶ An expanded and updated version of the NSS, published in March of 2006, restored¶ modest mentions of Canada and Mexico. The first one was implicit, not obviously¶ referring to North American countries exclusively, but certainly using reconciliatory¶ language: “America’s relations with other nations have been strong enough to withstand ¶ differences and candid exchanges of views… Some of our oldest and closest friends¶ disagreed with U.S. policy in Iraq. There are ongoing and serious debates with our allies¶ about how best to addressthe unique and evolving nature ofthe global terrorist threat.”¶ 21¶ As part of the regional sections of the 2006 NSS, the already well-established bilateral¶ and trilateral cooperative efforts with Mexico and Canada, especially through the¶ Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America, were modestly reflected: “…Our¶ strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and¶ Mexico, a foundation of shared values and cooperative policies that can be extended¶ throughout the region. We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere¶ to reduce illegal immigration and promote expanded economic opportunity for¶ marginalized populations.”¶ 22¶ The 2006 NSS reflects also –and only-- as “challenges of globalization” issues like¶ “Public health challengeslike pandemics(HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no¶ borders…illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern¶ era’s greater ease of transport and exchange…Environmental destruction, whether caused¶ by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes,¶ earthquakes, or tsunamis…These challenges are not traditional national security¶ concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can ¶ threaten national security.”¶ It is very indicative that these “global challenges,” whose importance as threats is far¶ lower than terrorism-based US security concerns, are high up on the list of security¶ threats of Canada and, especially, Mexico. In fact, they are threats to a¶ “multidimensional” concept of hemispheric security, promoted by Mexico, and formally ¶ adopted by the OAS membership in Mexico City in October 2003. At the time, the US¶ reluctantly joined the consensus on a text where defense issues and terrorism shared the¶ spectrum of security threats with the “non traditional” issues mentioned above.¶ 23¶ Not¶ surprisingly, all of those issues are either directly or tangentially addressed by the¶ trilateral agendas of the Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America from 2005¶ and on.

#### Democracy solves extinction

Diamond, prof of pol sci, 95—prof of political science and sociology, Stanford. Senior research fellow at Hoover. (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.html)

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that ­govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

#### Pandemic disease causes extinction

**Yu 9—**Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate, AMiles)

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

#### Environmental collapse causes extinction

CASBRC 1 (California Academy of Sciences Biodiversity Resource Center, “Threats To Biodiversity”, http://researcharchive.calacademy.org/research/library/biodiv/biodiversity\_defined.html)

Currently, more than 10,000 species become extinct each year and while precise calculation is difficult, it is certain that this rate has increased alarmingly in recent years. The central cause of species extinction is destruction of natural habitats by human beings. Human survival itself may depend upon reversing this accelerating threat to species diversity. Among the millions of undescribed species are important new sources of food, medicine and other products. When a species vanishes, we lose access to the survival strategies encoded in its genes through millions of years of evolution. We lose the opportunity to understand those strategies which may hold absolutely essential options for our own future survival as a species. And we lose not only this unique evolutionary experience, but emotionally, we lose the unique beauty, and the unique spirit, which mankind has associated with that life form. Many indigenous human cultures have also been driven to extinction by the same forces which have destroyed and continue to threaten non-human species. It is estimated that since 1900 more than 90 tribes of aboriginal peoples have gone extinct in the Amazon Basin. Nearly every habitat on earth is at risk: the rainforests and coral reefs of the tropics, the salt marshes and estuaries of our coastal regions, the tundra of the circumpolar north, the deserts of Asia and Australia, the temperate forests of North America and Europe, the savannahs of Africa and South America. Tropical rainforests, for example, are among the most diverse of all terrestrial ecosystems. Covering only 7% of the planet's surface, these forests comprise 50-80% of the world's species. 40 million to 50 million acres of tropical forest vanish each year -- about 1.5 acres per second -- as trees are cut for lumber or land is cleared for agriculture or other development. It is estimated that perhaps a quarter of the Earth's total biological diversity is threatened with extinction within 20 to 30 years. The Academy's Commitment The California Academy of Sciences is a leader among the world's institutions for research in evolutionary biology. Staff researchers study biodiversity worldwide, describing more than 100 new species every year. Current projects include work in La Amistad Biosphere Reserve, Costa Rica; the Impenetrable Forest, Uganda; the coral reefs of New Guinea and Madagascar; the deserts of southwestern Asia; and Socorro Island off the west coast of Mexico. Approximately 1.4 million species of plants and animals have been described by scientists. Conservative estimates suggest that at least 5 million remain to be identified -- the vast majority of them in the tropics. Fewer than 1,500 biologists worldwide are now qualified to identify tropical species. If ever there was an urgent requirement for this expertise, it is now, in this time of rapid environmental erosion.

### 1AC – Energy

#### Advantage 2: Energy

#### North American energy sector is at a turning point – increased investment in Mexico’s energy sector is critical to reduce power of US adversaries

Keppel 13

Stephen, “U.S., Mexico and Canada Could Become Energy Independent”, April 17, <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/us-mexico-canada-verge-energy-independence/story?id=18942259#.UdSsLvm1FiK>, CMR

Just seven years after President George W. Bush lamented the United States' addiction to foreign oil, we are on the verge of energy independence. The United States and Canada are in the midst of a boom in oil and gas production at the same time that U.S. fuel consumption is falling. The result is turning energy markets on their heads.¶ Add to that the potential for energy reform in Mexico, which many believe would unleash a surge in exploration and production, and North America is positioned to become a global energy powerhouse.¶ U.S. oil production is at its highest level in 20 years, while its oil demand is at a 17-year low. According to a recent Citigroup report, in just five years the U.S. may no longer need to import oil from any source but Canada.¶ Driving the North American oil boom are technological innovation and increased investment. New production techniques like horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking", have allowed producers to extract oil and gas from rock formations that were previously thought to be impenetrable. Oil and gas production has jumped in states like North Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania, which together are producing 1.5 million barrels of oil a day. That total rivals the output of major producers like Venezuela, which is currently exporting around 1.6 million barrels per day.¶ What would North American energy independence actually mean?¶ In the most basic terms, the U.S. would no longer have to rely on importing oil from countries that are hostile to its interests. Continued increases in production would also decrease global prices which would reduce the power of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes top producers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela.¶ According to Ed Morse, Citigroup's Head of Commodities Research, the average price of a barrel of oil could drop to the $70-$90 range (prices are currently around $95 per barrel, down from $112 per barrel in 2012).¶ The U.S. economy would be a clear winner. The boom has already resulted in lower natural gas prices, boosting U.S. industry and helping the economy rebound from the Great Recession. The reduced cost of oil would also benefit the non-oil producers in Central America and the Caribbean.¶ Mexico, meanwhile, is in a more precarious position. If it is able to better integrate itself in the U.S.-Canadian energy market and open up its state-run oil industry, it could reap the benefits of lower prices and increased investment. There are a lot of wells on the Mexican side of the Gulf of Mexico that are just waiting to be tapped.¶ On the other hand, Mexican oil exports to the U.S. are declining thanks to the increased U.S. production, and without significant investment in production and infrastructure such as pipelines, it will fail to capitalize on the U.S.-Canada boom.

#### Increased investment in Mexico’s energy sector key to unlocking oil and gas reserves

Manley et al. 5 – Senior Counsel at McCarthy Te´trault LLP

John M, “Building a North American Community”, online, CMR

Develop a North American Resource Strategy¶ All three North American countries produce substantial amounts of¶ energy, but the region as a whole is a net importer of energy. Washington’s¶ two neighbors are its biggest suppliers of energy. The production¶ of oil and natural gas on the continent is not keeping up with the¶ growth in demand.¶ Although North American production of oil and gas has been¶ declining, both Canada and Mexico have the potential to develop¶ growing supplies both for their own direct use and for export. These¶ two countries, however, have distinct approaches to the development¶ of energy and other natural resources that must be taken into account¶ in the process of mapping the best path forward for North America.¶ Canada is committed to efficient energy markets, open investment,¶ and free trade in this sector. Canada’s vast oilsands, once a high-cost¶ experimental means of extracting oil, now provide a viable new source¶ of energy that is attracting a steady stream of multibillion dollar investments¶ and interest from countries such as China, and they have catapulted¶ Canada into second place in the world in terms of proved oil¶ reserves. Production from oilsands fields is projected to reach 2 million¶ barrels per day by 2010. The most serious constraints on additional¶ growth are the limited supply of skilled people and the shortage of¶ infrastructure, including housing, transportation links, and pipeline¶ capacity. Another constraint is regulatory approval processes that can¶ slow down both resource and infrastructure development significantly.¶ Mexico is also a major energy supplier and customer within North¶ America. In 2004, it was the second-largest exporter of oil to the United¶ States; in previous years, it was consistently among the top four suppliers.¶ Mexico relies for a significant share of its revenues on the state oil¶ producer (Pemex). It has major oil and gas reserves, but these are¶ relatively untapped. Development has been hampered by constitutional¶ restrictions on ownership, which are driven by an understandable desire¶ to see this strategic asset used for the benefit ofMexicans. This restriction¶ on investment, coupled with the inefficient management of the state¶ monopoly, Pemex, has contributed to low productivity. As a result,¶ Mexico has expensive and unreliable supplies of energy for its consumers¶ and industries. Mexico has begun to bring in some foreign capital¶ through multiple service contracts, but the most serious constraints on¶ its future growth as an energy supplier are the restrictions that impede¶ development of its own energy resources and the low productivity of¶ Pemex. Reforms in this area are needed urgently.¶ Although energy security represents perhaps the most critical challenge,¶ it is important to recognize that trade in other natural resources,¶ including metals, minerals, wood, and other products, is also central¶ to the growth and economic security of North America. In these other¶ resource sectors, NAFTA has not succeeded in ensuring a free flow of¶ goods. Resource and agricultural products such as softwood lumber,¶ fish, beef, wheat, and sugar have been the flashpoints for highly visible¶ trade disputes. The softwood lumber case has led some Canadians to¶ question whether the United States will comply with NAFTA if decisions¶ by the dispute-settlement mechanism run counter to private¶ American interests.TheUnited States andMexico have failed tocomply¶ with free trade provisions on movement of trucks for more than a¶ decade, and the failure to resolve the softwood lumber case between¶ Canada and the United States has plagued their trade relations for¶ the past quarter century. Changing some trade rules and the disputesettlement¶ process may reduce this friction, as would a determined effort¶ to reduce unnecessary regulatory differences within North America.¶ NorthAmerica is blessed with an abundant resource base. Exploiting¶ these resources on a long-term, sustainable basis requires that the three¶ governments work together to resolve issues and ensure responsible¶ use of scarce resources and the free flow of both resources and capital¶ across all three borders. As noted, the most troubled areas of crossborder¶ trade over the past twenty years have been in resource trade,¶ largely because of the impact of regulatory differences, including different¶ approaches to resource pricing and income protection. Efforts to¶ eliminate these problems on the basis of dispute-settlementmechanisms¶ have not worked as well as anticipated.¶ WHAT WE SHOULD DO NOW¶ • Develop a NorthAmerican energy strategy. Recognizing their¶ individual policies and priorities, the three governments need to¶ work together to ensure energy security for people in all three¶ countries. Issues to be addressed include the expansion and protection¶ of theNorthAmerican energy infrastructure; development opportunities¶ and regulatory barriers; and the technological andhuman capital¶ constraints on accelerated development of energy resources within¶ North America. These objectives form part of the agenda of the¶ North American Energy Working Group established in 2001 by¶ the leaders of the three countries and emphasized in their 2005¶ summit meeting. This initiative, however, has so far made only¶ modest progress toward developing a North American strategy, and¶ it does not cover oil.¶ • Fully develop Mexican energy resources. Although the inclination¶ of Mexico to retain full ownership of its strategic resources is¶ understandable, expanded and more efficient development of these¶ resources is needed to accelerate Mexico’s economic growth. Mexico¶ is quickly losing ground in its energy independence, and the only¶ way to satisfy growing demands within Mexico is to find ways to¶ unlock its energy sector. Progress can be made even under the¶ existing constitutional constraints. As discussed above, Canada and¶ the United States could make important contributions in this effort¶ through the development of creative mechanisms, especially financial,¶ that bring needed technology and capital to Mexico. The most¶ important steps, however, must be taken in Mexico by Mexicans.

#### Independently, the plan encourages internal reform in Mexico’s energy sector

Pastor 8 – Director @ Center for North American Studies

Robert A, “The Solution to North America’s Triple Problem: The Case for a North American Investment Fund”, Year 2, No. 2, January, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/triple_problem_pastor.pdf>, CMR

(5) A Community and Conditionality. Of the $20 billion each year for the North ¶ American Investment Fund, Canada and the United States should pay half, with the ¶ U.S.—with about nine times the economy of Canada—accounting for 90 percent of that. ¶ Mexico should contribute the other $10 billion. The United States and Canada are ¶ unlikely to contribute funds unless both countries felt that it would be used wisely and ¶ that Mexico would undertake serious long-term reforms. Mexico understands that it ¶ needs to undertake fundamental reforms in sensitive sectors such as energy, taxes, ¶ pensions, electricity, and the judicial system but the political system has been stalemated. ¶ If its partners were to define, together, a community of three nations in which each would ¶ contribute to that future, then that might alter the political balance in a way that would ¶ make both the reforms and the Fund possible. Absent those changes, the U.S. and ¶ Canada might very well conclude that their funds would not be put to good use and ¶ would not want to contribute. Spain and Ireland understood the need for reforms but they ¶ could only implement them with the support of the EU.

#### This framework will shield the US from vulnerability of foreign sources

Gjelten 12 (Tom, “Energy Independence For U.S.? Try Energy Security”, 10/25, <http://www.npr.org/2012/10/25/163573768/energy-independence-for-u-s-try-energy-security>, CMR)

Gone from this year's presidential campaign are most mentions of climate change, environmental pollution, or green jobs. Former Gov. Mitt Romney, the GOP presidential nominee, prefers to call attention instead to the country's continuing dependence on foreign energy sources.¶ "I will set a national goal of North American energy independence by the year 2020," Romney declared in August.¶ The line is now a standard part of Romney's stump speech, and he repeated it in his first two debates with President Obama.¶ With that promise, Romney joins a long line of U.S. leaders who have preached the virtues of energy independence. Few, however, have explained precisely what this goal means.¶ A Global Market¶ In truth, it would be virtually impossible for any country to be totally independent where energy is concerned. Not only would it have to produce all its own oil; it would also have to be independent of the global economy.¶ Energy¶ Could U.S. Produce Enough Oil To Rival Saudi Arabia?¶ Like sugar, wheat, gold and other commodities, oil is also bought and sold on a global market. All the oil produced in the world becomes part of the global oil supply; all the oil used comes out of that supply. The global oil price depends on the supply/demand relation, and the price is essentially the same for all countries.¶ Energy analyst Amy Jaffe likens players in the global oil market to swimmers in a swimming pool.¶ "If you're in the deep end or the shallow end and somebody takes water out of the pool, it affects both swimmers equally," Jaffe says. "[It's the] same thing if we start pouring water in. You're not pouring the water into just the deep end or just the shallow end."¶ With oil, all countries are affected when the total supply is down relative to demand; the price goes up. When the supply is boosted and there is plenty of oil for everyone, the global price goes down.¶ With respect to price, therefore, there is no such thing as energy independence. Even if the U.S. were producing as much oil as it was consuming, a halt in production by Iran or Saudi Arabia would still drive up the oil price in the U.S.¶ Energy Security¶ But there is another way to think about energy independence. If a country produces as much oil as it uses, it is less vulnerable to some foreign country shutting the tap. Jaffe, executive director of energy and sustainability at the University of California, Davis, says this is the big reason governments want to reduce their dependence on foreign oil producers.¶ "If someone is going to cut off your supply, because they don't like your foreign policy or they want to keep you from attacking a country, this is a dangerous thing," Jaffe says.¶ But is "energy independence" the proper term to describe the national goal?¶ "I prefer the term 'energy security,' " says Roger Altman, who served as deputy Treasury secretary under President Clinton.¶ "What that means," Altman says, "is, 'Let's get to the point where the amount we import from rogue or potentially rogue nations who might be hostile to us is down to a point where, if suddenly that supply was interrupted or shut off, we go right on.' "¶ The U.S. learned the importance of "energy security" in 1973, when Arab countries imposed an oil boycott on the United States to protest its military support for Israel in its war against Egypt and Syria. Americans were soon waiting in long lines at gas stations.¶ In response to the Arab oil boycott, President Nixon set a new national goal in his 1974 State of the Union speech.¶ "At the end of this decade, in the year 1980," Nixon proposed, "the United States will not be dependent on any other country for the energy we need to provide our jobs, to heat our homes and to keep our transportation moving."¶ A Glimmer Of Hope¶ The fact that we are still talking about this goal nearly 40 years later shows how hard it is to achieve. But there is reason now to believe that energy security may finally be within reach. Energy production in the U.S. is booming, thanks in large part to new techniques for extracting oil and gas from hard-to-reach deposits.¶ According to the latest estimates from the U.S. government's Energy Information Administration, U.S. production of oil and other liquid petroleum products could soon overtake production from Saudi Arabia, the world's No. 1 oil producer. Oil imports, meanwhile, are declining.¶ U.S. energy demand remains high, however, and it is likely to be years before the United States has an energy supply entirely its own.¶ Even in that case, however, the U.S. could significantly boost its energy security, because new production throughout the Western Hemisphere would leave the country less vulnerable to a shutoff from the Middle East or elsewhere.¶ "It doesn't mean we would never import another barrel of oil outside the Western Hemisphere," says Altman, who is now the chairman of Evercore Partners, an investment banking firm. "What it means is that most of our oil imports would come from Canada, Mexico, Brazil and so forth, and whatever happened in the Middle East would have no severe downside for our economic stability."¶ This is progress. It's hard to imagine how a conflict with Brazil or Mexico, much less with Canada, could jeopardize the U.S. energy supply.

#### Dependence causes multiple war scenarios

Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser\_-\_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx)

**Oil dependence** could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can leave a state open to coercion**—recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a** weaker bargaining position **and is** more likely to make concessions. Closely related, **if war occurs the state is** more likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil; rather, when states already have incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war. Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States to fight a long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an important role in destroying Japan’s ability to fight. This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger today because the United States does not face a major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy. Protecting access to oil threatens other states—an access-driven security dilemma **The vulnerability of** a state’s **access to oil** supplies **could reduce** its **security via** a second, more complicated mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s security, then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow standard **security-dilemma logic,** but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing the standard focus on protection of territory. In the most extreme case, **a state could try to solve its import vulnerability through** territorial expansion. In less extreme cases, **the state could deal with its vulnerability by building up military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of** decreasing its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the state’s motives are malign, **which** decreases the adversary’s security, which **leads the adversary to** build up its own military forces. Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt an offensive capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by **this security dilemma** need not be over oil or access to oil; by damaging political relations the security dilemma **could prevent** the **states from** resolving political disputes **and** avoiding the escalation of crises. Here again, the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military status quo currently favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts to protect its access to oil could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States. Oil makes territory increasingly valuable In this type of case, **a state places greater value on owning territory because the territory contains energy resources** that are increasingly valuable. **The greater value** of territory **can** increase competition between states, **because the benefits of success grow relative** to the costs of competition, for example, the costs of arming. For similar reasons, the greater value of territory increases the probability that crises over territory will lead to war instead of negotiated compromises, as states are more willing to run the risks of fighting. This type of conflict is the classic resource war, which is the path by which oil is most commonly envisioned leading to conflict. We can also hypothesize that the probability of conflict is greater when territorial boundaries are contested and the political status quo is ambiguous. Because the norm of state sovereignty is now widely held, states are less likely to launch expansionist wars to take other states’ territory. However, when boundaries are not settled, states are more likely to compete to acquire territory they value and will compete harder when they value it more. In addition, unsettled boundaries increase the possibilities for boundedly rational bargaining failures that could lead to war. There are two basic paths via which a state could become involved in this type of oil conflict. The more obvious is for the state to be a claimant in the dispute and become directly involved in a territorial conflict. The second is likely more important for the United States—an alliance commitment could draw the state into a resource conflict that initially began between its ally and another state. The state would not have energy interests of its own at stake, but intervenes to protect its ally. Along this path, energy plays an important but less direct role in damaging the state’s security, because although energy interests fuel the initial conflict, they do not motivate the state’s intervention. A later section explores the possibility of conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, with the United States drawn in to protect Japan and consequently involved in a war with China. **When a state’s economy depends heavily on oil, severe supply disruptions might do sufficiently large economic damage that** the state would use military force to protect its prosperity. **A state** this suffers this vulnerability risks not only suffering the damage that could be inflicted by a supply disruption, which might be the by-product of unrelated domestic or international events, but also risks being coerced by an adversary. Consequently, states will want to be confident that their ability to import oil will be uninterrupted and will pursue policies to ensure secure access.

#### Specifically, oil dependence makes conflict over the Strait of Hormuz inevitable – that *escalates* and *goes nuclear*

Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser\_-\_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx)

Energy dependence could draw the United States into a conflict in which a regional power was interrupting, or threatening to interrupt, the flow of oil. The economic costs of a disruption would determine whether the costs of fighting were justified. Similarly, the potential economic costs of a disruption would determine whether U.S. foreign and military policy should be devoted to deterring states from interrupting the flow of oil; more precisely, these economic costs would determine how much the United States should invest in the policies required for deterrence. Given the geographical distribution of oil, such a conflict would likely occur in the Persian Gulf. The greatest danger is probably posed by Iran—the Iraq War has greatly increased Iran’s power relative to Iraq, and Iran is acquiring improved missile capabilities and making progress toward having the capability to build nuclear weapons. The most disruptive Iranian action would be closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which the vast majority of Persian Gulf oil must pass. Having identified the danger posed by dependence on oil that transits this strait (as well as the Strait of Malacca), a recent Council on Foreign Relations study concluded that the “United States should take the lead in building an infrastructure protection program that would be based on practical steps by relevant countries and address critical infrastructures and transit routes. Initial efforts should focus on joint planning, technical assistance, and military exercises, especially involving naval units operating near ports or along critical sea-lanes.” Although difficult to estimate the probability that Iran would attempt to close the strait, analysts have offered reasons for expecting the probability to be quite low: Iran would lose the oil revenue from its own exports; and Iran would likely be deterred by the probable costs of U.S. intervention, which could include the destruction of key military bases and occupation of some of its territory. Because so much oil flows through the strait, the United States would almost certainly respond to keep it open. Nevertheless, there are plausible scenarios in which Iran blocks the strait, for example, as retaliation for an attack against is nuclear weapons program or as a coercive measure if losing a conventional war. Careful analysis suggests that the United States would prevail, but that a successful campaign could take many weeks or more, and that oil prices would increase significantly during this period. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of this scenario in two basic ways. First, Iran might believe that the possibility of escalation to nuclear weapons would deter the United States from responding, making Iran more willing to interrupt tanker traffic. Although basic deterrence logic says this calculation points in the correct direction, the United States might nevertheless intervene. The United States would question Iran’s willingness to escalate to nuclear use because America’s far larger and more capable nuclear forces would pose a formidable retaliatory threat. In addition, the United States would have incentives to make clear that possession of a small number of nuclear weapons by a much weaker state would not deter the United States from using conventional weapons in a limited war. Being deterred by the Iranian nuclear force would suggest that small nuclear arsenals provide tremendous potential for launching conventional aggression. As Barry Posen argued in a related context (the counterfactual case in which Iraq possessed nuclear weapons before deciding to invade Kuwait), “If the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait is permitted to stand, nuclear weapons will come to be viewed as a shield that protects conventional conquests from any challenger, including a great power heavily armed with its own nuclear weapons.” Consequently, the United States would have incentives to respond to Iranian aggression both to preserve its ability to deter conventional aggression by small nuclear states and to support its nonproliferation policy. Second, once a conventional conflict occurred, there would be the danger that U.S. conventional operations could increase the probability [of] nuclear war. A number of paths are possible. The U.S. mine clearing operation required to open the strait would likely be accompanied by attacks against land-based Iranian targets. The United States would want to destroy the land-based anti-ship cruise missiles that Iran could use to threaten U.S. mine clearing ships; in addition, the United States would want to destroy Iranian air defenses that could be used to protect these missiles. These U.S. strikes would require large numbers of carrier-based aircraft flying sorties over a period of a few weeks or more. If Iran lacked confidence that U.S. aims were limited, it could feel compelled to put its nuclear forces on alert to increase their survivability, which would increase the probability of accidental or unauthorized nuclear attack. The United States could then have incentives to attack Iran’s nuclear force, either preemptively because it believed Iran was preparing to launch an attack or preventively because it faced a closing window of opportunity after which Iran’s nuclear forces would be survivable. A more subtle danger is the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation resulting from a situation in which Iranian leaders decide to escalate because they believe, incorrectly, that the United States has decided to destroy their nuclear force (or ability to launch it). U.S. conventional operations could create this danger by destroying Iranian radars, and command and control systems, leaving Iranian leaders unable to assess the U.S. conventional campaign and fearing that the United States was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion or a conventional attack against their nuclear forces.

### Solvency

#### Investment fund reinvigorates US regional leadership and sustains long-term cooperation with Mexico while promoting successful integration

Pastor 12 – prof and director of the Center for North American Studies @ American

Robert A, Beyond the Continental Divide, July/August, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269>, CMR

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada should seek to construct a North American Community that would invigorate their economies and improve the region’s competitiveness with Asia and Europe, enhance continental and public security, address more effectively the new transnational agenda, and design lean but effective trinational institutions for the 21st century. ¶ Such a Community would advance the principal goals of each country. For Mexico, it would narrow the development gap and lift its people to First-World status. For Canada, it would create institutions that would bind the three nations to agreed standards. For the United States, it would create a new style of leadership more aligned with long-term goals than with short-term special interests. For all three countries, it would allow a more cooperative and effective approach to transnational issues like transportation, infrastructure, immigration, anti-narcotics policies and the environment. ¶ The vision that undergirds this proposal is based on a principle of managed interdependence. If one country suffers a setback, all are hurt; success for one helps the others. The principle is simple and often lauded by leaders, but rarely acted on. If the United States actually accepted its “shared responsibility” for the drug problem, for example, it would get serious about making sure the 7,500 gun shops on the U.S. side of the border do not sell weapons to drug cartels. And if all three countries actually incorporated a sense of community, they would advertise “Buy North America” instead of “Buy USA”, “Buy Mexico” or “Buy Canada.”¶ The word “Community” refers to a group in which the members feel an affinity and desire to cooperate. It is not a union, and their relationship would differ from Europe’s, although, as already suggested, it should try to learn from Europe’s experience. It would be flexible enough for the three countries to define the new relationship that they would seek. Like the people and states of North America, the Community would be eminently pragmatic, choosing policies based on what advances the interests of all. ¶ By moving from a dual-bilateral relationship to a trilateral approach, the three countries could avoid duplication and clashing efforts. They would replace power imbalances with fair rules and would mobilize all three peoples to attack problems rather than each other. ¶ In December 2011, the U.S. and Canadian governments presented “Action Plans” on the border and regulatory convergence, and the U.S. and Mexican governments repeated the same exercise. The three countries restated the goal that they announced a decade before in the two “Smart Borders” agreements: to make the border efficient and secure. And they affirmed the need to harmonize regulations, just as they did in 2005, when they established the Security and Prosperity Partnership to avoid “the tyranny of small differences in regulations” that serve only to protect companies rather than benefit consumers. ¶ As it turned out, the “Action Plans” were really inaction plans. They set one-year deadlines for studies on virtually every issue identified a decade ago without ever trying to explain why the three governments had failed to achieve their goals. The Obama Administration waited until its third year to announce studies that won’t be completed until December 2012. The leaders called the plans “game-changers”, but anyone who bothered to read them knew they were playing the same old games. This was little more than a full-employment act for bureaucrats.¶ It is possible, of course, that a trilateral approach might not yield any more effective policies than the dual-bilateral efforts have so far. Nevertheless, it is clear that the only way to move forward on the agenda is for the leaders to grasp the North American opportunity, give it a high priority and organize their governments to accomplish their goals. It’s also clear we need to create institutions to help the three governments think continentally. At a minimum, we need a North American Advisory Commission to prepare continental options for all three leaders to consider and choose at annual summits. ¶ There is no paucity of problems to address. The three leaders should call for a North American Plan for Transportation and Infrastructure, for example, and establish a North American Investment fund that would connect the poorest southern regions of Mexico with the richer North American market. Such a fund would create the infrastructure in the south of Mexico that would attract investment and jobs and thus reduce migration to the north. ¶ To create a seamless market, the three countries should negotiate a common external tariff. That would eliminate the excessive “rules of origin” tax of about $500 billion per year, and the nominal common tariff could be used to fund the North American Investment Fund. Building roads, dismantling unnecessary border restrictions, expanding educational opportunities across the continent, harmonizing and raising environmental and labor standards, training tri-national teams of customs officers—these small steps could begin to invigorate the sleeping giant of North America.

#### Canada also supports the plan

Pastor 8 – Director @ Center for North American Studies

Robert A, “The Solution to North America’s Triple Problem: The Case for a North American Investment Fund”, Year 2, No. 2, January, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/triple_problem_pastor.pdf>, CMR

**In addition to economic interests, there are three reasons** why **Canada should want** ¶ **to build a North American Community and contribute to a fund to narrow the** ¶ **development gap**. First, **Canada is a multilateral institution-builder and there is no** ¶ **relationship more important to Canada than with the U**nited **S**tates (James, Michaud, ¶ O’Reilly, 2007, ch. 1). It follows that a tri-national institution could be constructed in a ¶ manner that would serve Canada’s long-term interests in assuring that the U.S. negotiates ¶ fairly and complies with the rules of an agreement. **Second**ly, **Canada wants the U.S. to** ¶ **pay attention to its concerns and is frustrated that it does not. A joint approach with** ¶ **Mexico,** which can gain US attention because of the large Mexican-American population, ¶ **would certainly assist Canada**. But Mexico and Canada are likely to be more effective if ¶ they pursue fair rules rather than appear as if they are conspiring against the U.S. ¶ **The three governments should set the goal of helping Mexico achieve a sustained** ¶ **rate of growth for at least one decade of at least 6 percent per year**. If one assumes that ¶ the U.S. and Canada maintain a growth rate of 3 percent, the income gap would be ¶ reduced by 20 percent in the first decade and, hopefully, provide the momentum to close ¶ the gap within 40-50 years. While it would be desirable for the gap to be closed, the ¶ trajectory may be as important. If Mexicans see the gap closing in a consistent way, selfperceptions could change, and that could mean that fewer Mexicans would emigrate.

#### Only an investment fund can restore US-Mexico relations, boost competitiveness, and eliminate the income gap to slow illegal immigration

Pastor 8 – Director @ Center for North American Studies

Robert A, “The Solution to North America’s Triple Problem: The Case for a North American Investment Fund”, Year 2, No. 2, January, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/triple_problem_pastor.pdf>, CMR

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect on ¶ January 1, 1994 and, in thirteen years, trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United ¶ States tripled and foreign direct investment quintupled, making North America the largest ¶ free trade area in the world. Despite this success, relations among all three countries ¶ deteriorated, and a swirl of problems led many to view NAFTA as a failure. ¶ A major cause of the deterioration of relations is the failure of the three ¶ governments to find agreement on immigration, trade, and security. None of these ¶ problems can be solved easily or soon but serious progress is not possible until the three ¶ governments begin to construct a “community of interests” in which each of the them ¶ commit significant resources and undertake reforms to close the income gap between ¶ Mexico and its two neighbors and forge institutions and procedures to sustain trust. ¶ Why is the income gap so important to each of the three issues? Contrary to ¶ conventional wisdom, more than 90 percent of the undocumented workers from Mexico ¶ do not come to the United States seeking jobs. They leave jobs in Mexico for much ¶ better wages in the United States. Unless the income gap is significantly narrowed, ¶ migration from Mexico will continue to expand. Securing the United States after 9/11 ¶ depends on a secure continent and that is difficult when one of the weakest links is ¶ Mexico’s poverty. Finally, free trade policies have become unpopular because of chronic ¶ disputes, the view by some in the United States that it loses jobs because of free trade, the ¶ failure of the United States to comply with NAFTA courts, and the view that Mexico ¶ would be more developed if free trade worked. ¶ All three problems point to the same solution: a North American Investment Fund ¶ which invests $20 billion per year for a decade to close the income gap by grants to build ¶ infrastructure—roads, communications, railroads, ports—to connect the poor center and ¶ south of Mexico to its northern neighbors. Ten billion dollars would come from ¶ additional taxes by Mexicans; $9 billion would come from the United States, and $1 ¶ billion from Canada. But these would only be part of an arrangement whereby Mexico ¶ undertakes the kinds of reforms that would allow it to make effective use of these ¶ resources. ¶ Such a Fund is only possible if the three governments articulate a North American ¶ Community and pledge to contribute, each in its own way, to a strategy that will close the ¶ income gap and build institutions to resolve old problems and address new opportunities. ¶ That is the solution. Now, what exactly is the problem? If immigrants contribute to the ¶ U.S. economy so much, why is it a problem? ¶ During a state visit by Mexican President Vicente Fox in September 2001, just ¶ days before the September 11th tragedy, President George W. Bush agreed to reform U.S. ¶ immigration laws as they affected Mexico. There are about 11 million “undocumented ¶ workers” in the United States, of whom about 6.3 million are Mexicans. Fox wanted to ¶ regularize the status of the Mexicans and ensure a large and steady flow of temporary ¶ workers. Despite Bush’s pledge to address the issue, four years passed before he sent his ¶ Cabinet to Congress to outline his Administration’s approach. On October 18, 2005, ¶ U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff testified: “The President believes—¶ and I agree—that illegal immigration threatens our communities and our national ¶ security.” He proposed more funding for border patrol, even though the number of ¶ officers tripled and the budget increased ten-fold during the previous two decades ¶ (Massey 2005). ¶ While the U.S. was concerned with security, the immigration issue is primarily an ¶ economic and social issue. The U.S. wants cheap labor and Mexicans want better wages ¶ in the United States. There is nothing wrong with that, except that Mexicans who are in ¶ the United States illegally are easily exploited and, thus, are compelled to work harder at ¶ wages too low for most Americans. Even during the boom years of the 1990s, when the ¶ income of most Americans improved, the wages of native-born unskilled workers ¶ declined by about 10 percent, due, in part, to more competition by illegal workers. There ¶ is, also, a humanitarian issue of dealing with 11 million illegal migrants in the country. ¶ The United States has embarked on a long journey to cope with these problems, ¶ and while there are many proposals to “regularize” the 11 million undocumented workers ¶ in the country, none can do so without provoking a new wave of illegal migration. None ¶ of these proposals will solve or even reduce the flow of undocumented migration to the ¶ United States. Indeed, regularizing the status of those who are here illegally may well ¶ encourage greater flows in the future. This is what occurred after passage of the 1986 ¶ Immigration Reform and Control Act, which combined legalization, which was ¶ implemented, and employer sanctions, which were largely ignored. This was one of the ¶ reasons why immigration reform failed to pass the Senate in June 2007. ¶ The American people are increasingly frustrated and worried about the inability ¶ of the U.S. government to control the borders. A New York Times/CBS poll in October ¶ 2005 found that 75% of Americans think that the government should do much more to ¶ keep out illegal aliens, and by May 2007, 82% of Americans felt that way (“Poll finds ¶ 69% Believe Illegal Immigrants Should be Deported,” New York Times, May 25, 2007). ¶ However, no one has proposed an effective strategy to address the challenge. The reason ¶ is that it would be very expensive to solve this problem because there is only one way to ¶ reduce that flow. The development gap between the United States and Mexico must be ¶ narrowed. A strategy aimed to accomplish that goal would not only reduce illegal ¶ migration; it would solve several other chronic problems in North America and beyond. ¶ Many in Mexico viewed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as ¶ a vehicle to achieve a first-world economy and close the development gap that separated ¶ it from its northern neighbors. Many in the United States supported NAFTA in the hope ¶ that it would reduce undocumented migration from Mexico. Many in Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean looked at NAFTA as a model for a Free Trade Area of the Americas ¶ (FTAA), which would allow them to board a train to the first world. Although NAFTA ¶ expanded trade within North America, neither the development gap nor undocumented ¶ migration diminished and, as it became clear that free-trade did not achieve the promise ¶ of development, many in Latin America and beyond questioned the utility of free trade. ¶ Until free trade can be viewed as beneficial to its poorer members, the prospect of ¶ expanding its boundaries will remain small. ¶ Unless and until the development gap between Mexico and the U.S. can begin to ¶ close, the prospect of having a genuine partnership among the three countries of North ¶ America will remain distant. There are other compelling reasons for the three ¶ governments to consider the development gap as the paramount challenge facing North ¶ America. NAFTA, at best, has run out of steam; the continental relationships are in ¶ danger of going into reverse. The policy responses to 9/11 and the creation of the ¶ Department of Homeland Security have constructed a formidable speed bump on the two ¶ borders that impede trade. ¶ NAFTA may be viewed as a problem but “North America” is, actually, a ¶ magnificent opportunity. Stimulating Mexico’s economy might be one of the best ways ¶ to promote competitiveness for the entire continent. The most effective response to ¶ competition from China, for example, is one that merges the comparative advantages of ¶ each unit of North America. Developing a community of interests in which the three ¶ governments take steps to make the continent more secure and their relationships fair ¶ would establish the region as the model.

#### The plan jumpstarts broad internal reforms in Mexico that promote economic growth while creating effective border security

Hussain ‘8 – Prof of IR @ the Dept of Int’l Studies, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City

Imtiaz, “Community, diffusion, & North American expansiveness”, google books, CMR

North American is different from Europe, but it should learn from the experience, and establish a North American Investment Fund that would invest $20b per year for a decade to build roads to connect the south and center of Mexico to the United States. Mexico should provide half of the funds; the US, 40%, and Canada, 10%. The funds should be administered by the World Bank. To make best use of these resources, Mexico needs also to undertake fiscal, energy, electricity, and labor reforms. However, instead of making the aid conditional or waiting for Mexico to do the reforms, the three leaders should decide how each would contribute to the community’s goal of narrowing the gap. This approach would give Mexico the leverage to undertake the reforms. ¶ The North American Investment Fund would spend less than half as much as Europe did in half the time, but coupled with comprehensive reforms, it would propel Mexico’s economy forward. The US contribution over ten years would be about one-third of what it has spent in Iraq in the last three years, but in this case the US economy would benefit. This fund won’t end illegal immigration overnight or even in 10 years, but unless something is done to reduce the income gap, illegal migration will increase. If Mexico grows at twice the rate of the US and Canada, as would occur under this plan, the gap will close by 20% in a decade, and Mexicans will begin to think about their future in Mexico rather than plan for their exit north. ¶ A community approach to narrowing the income gap would yield dividends in other areas. In a post-9/11 world, the best way to assure the security of North America is not at our borders with Canada and Mexico and not by defining “security” solely by fences, but rather by forging a consensus with our neighbors to build a North American Security Perimeter. Canadian, Mexican, and US officials would work together on the same team, sharing intelligence and using the same procedures and exclusion lists at every port of entry. This would supplement, not eliminate existing border protection. [Page 37-38]

#### The plan result in enhanced and effective investment and the US is key

Manley, et al. ‘5 – Senior Counsel @ McCarthy Tetrault LLP

John P, “Building a North American Community”, Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, google books, CMR

Establish a North American Investment fund for infrastructure and human capital. With a more conducive investment climate in Mexico, private funds will be more accessible for infrastructure and development projects. The United States and Canada should establish a North American Investment Fund to encourage private capital flow to Mexico. The fund would focus on increasing and improving physical infrastructure linking the less developed parts of Mexico to the markets in the north, improving primary and secondary education, and technical training in states and municipalities committed to transparency and institutional development. A relatively small amount of funds should be targeted for technical assistance for project design and evaluation, management, and training. If the North American Investment Fund is to be effective, it will need significant help from the United States and Canada, and counterpart funding through higher tax revenues from Mexico. The fund design should consider such issues as incentives and debt absorption and management capacity of subnational government to ensure that resources are effectively used. The fund will need to be managed in a transparent manner according to best international practices, and should be capitalized through a diverse set of innovative financial mechanisms. Availability of credit enhancement mechanisms for long-term loans in pesos will be critical. [page 14]